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I. INTRODUCTION

My task is three fold. I shall first give a very brief introduction to the topic
of self-determination within the general jurisprudence of the proliferation of
international dispute settlement mechanisms. Next, I shall explore why this
proliferation of fora has not occurred for settling claims to self-determination.
Finally, I want to suggest a particular mechanism for the settlement of selfdetermination claims that may, in the long term, prove successful.
I. SELF-DETERMINATION

Much, perhaps too much, has been written about the topic of self-determination. We have moved from Woodrow Wilson's pronouncement at the conference
to confirm the Treaty of Versailles' on through tomes of scholarship on the
definition of who, or which groups, have a right to claim self-determination, 2 to
*

Professor of Law and Director of the International Law Concentration at Suffolk University Law

School, Boston, MA.
1.
Full text of Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 (including original text of each of the 440 treaty
articles), Department of History at the University of San Diego, at http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versailles
treaty/vereontents.htmi (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). See also EDWARD MANDELL, WHAT REALLY HAPPENED
AT PARIS: THE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE,

1918-1919, 407 (Charles E. Merrill ed. 1921) and

NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 2-3 (Margaret Moore, ed., Oxford Univ. 1998).

2.
See generally NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION (Margaret Moore ed., Oxford
Univ. 1998); see also Steven R. Ratner, Drawinga Better Line: Uti Possidetisand the Borders of New States,
90 AMER. J. INT'L. L 590 (1996).
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long discussions on the content of the right.3 Internal and external self-determination,4 measures of autonomy versus secession 5 have all been extensively
canvassed. The only principles that can be asserted with any confidence in this
area are that colonial peoples,6 and peoples living under foreign occupation,7
have a right to rule themselves. Beyond that, all is political will, supported
sometimes by sections of world opinion. That there have been successful claims
to self-determination,' even secession, 9 which represents the far end of the selfdetermination graph has not done much to move any part of the norm toward
acceptance, except the colonial or foreign occupation rule. East Timor fought
a bloody war and gained independence from Indonesia.' ° Eritrea has fought
several bloody wars with Ethiopia and has gained independence," but Biafra
was not successful in gaining independence from Nigeria despite thousands of
deaths.' 2 Dozens of other groups dare not raise their claims.
In spite of all of the accumulated scholarship, groups that claim self-determination have very few fora in which to present their claims. War is often the
only alternative. The Supreme Court of Canada did render a thoughtful judgment on the legality of Quebec's claim to secession but that decision was only
what the Canadians call a reference opinion, and what we would call an
advisory opinion, rendered after a request by the Canadian authorities. 3 The
purpose of this panel is to examine possible fora and mechanisms for resolving
3.

For history and content of right of self-determination, see DOV RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-

DETERMINATION, 1-70 (Yale Univ. Press 1979).
4.

Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of InternationalTerritorial

Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 590 (1991).

5.
Pierre Bienvenu, Secession By ConstitutionalMeans: The Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL'Y 185 (2001).
6.
REFERENCE RE: SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
7.
Michael J. Dennis, Human Rights in 2002: The Annual Sessions of the UN Commission on
Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council,97 AM. J. INT'LL. 364,365 (2003); see generallyAdam
Roberts, ProlongedMilitary Occupation: The Israeli-OccupiedTerritoriesSince 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44
(1990).
8.
Jonathan L Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 455 (2001).
9.
JORGE M. VALADEZ, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND SELFDETERMINATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 211 (Westview Press 2000).
10.
Richard Falk, The East Timor Ordeal: InternationalLaw and Its Limits, 32 BULLETIN OF

CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 49 (2000).
11.

WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS 103 (Brookings

Institution 1995).
12. Thomas D.Grant,East Timor, the U.N. System and EnforcingNon-Recognitionin International
Law, 33 VAND.J.TRANSNAT'LL. 33 (2000); JAMES D.D. SMITH, STOPPING WARS: DEFINING THE OBSTACLES
TO CEASE-FIRE 44-47 (Westview Press 1995).
13.
REFERENCE RE: SECESSION OF QUEBEC, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; see also Pierre Bienvenu,
Secession By ConstitutionalMeans: The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession
Reference, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL'Y 185 (2001).
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claims to self-determination, short of war. I think it is not unreasonable to
suppose that, for example, if the Kosovars had been able to present their claims
to self-determination in a recognized settlement mechanism, perhaps only at the
level of the restoration of the autonomy they had previously enjoyed, such a
process may have prevented the bloody conflict in Serbia/Montenegro/
Kosovo. 4 If that supposition is true, and could reasonably be expected to be
replicated many times over for other self-determination claims, finding
settlement fora becomes an enterprise of huge and worthwhile consequences.
Im. PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL

DISPUTE SETrLEMENT MECHANISMS

There has been much scholarship on the proliferation of international
dispute settlement mechanisms. I refer to the numerous books, periodical
articles, and studies that address the phenomenon of the recent proliferation of5
international courts and other international dispute settlement mechanisms.'
There is a wonderful two-volume book, now in its second edition, published by
the Max-Planck Institute called Dispute Settlement in Public International Law,
written by Karin Oellers-Frahm and Andreas Zimmerman.16 These two volumes
set out to provide a comprehensive account of all the available dispute
settlement mechanisms for interstate disputes. The book also contains al of the
relevant instruments creating the settlement mechanisms. The mechanisms
described range from the weakest systems, such as a reporting obligation, to the
most formal, such as a full-fledged court, and everything in between. The table
of contents alone runs to eighteen pages. Another good source for viewing the
developments in this area can be found at the web site of the Project on
International Courts and Tribunals put out by New York University. 7
The scholarship addressing the proliferation of international dispute
settlement fora falls into several categories. The international relations scholarship tends to ask why these new institutions have been thrown up at this
particular time. They develop a theory of legal and institutional change and try
to fit the phenomenon with the framework of a theory of change. 8
14.

ANDREW J. BACEVICH, WAR OVER KosovO: POLITICS AND STRATEGY IN A GLOBAL AGE

(Columbia Univ. Press 2001); see generallyTimothy Crawford, PivotalDeterrenceandthe Kosovo War: Why
the Holbrooke Agreement Failed, 116 POL. Sci. Q. 499 (2001).
15.
See generally D.A. Mundis, Current Developments At the Ad Hoc InternationalCriminal
Tribunals, 1 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUSTICE 197 (2003); S. de Bertodano, CurrentDevelopments in Internationalized

Courts, I J. INT'L. CRIM. JUSTICE 226 (2003); see also Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, ECJ, and the Integrity of
InternationalLaw, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2003).
16.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT INPUBLIC INT'L LAW (Vol. I and U) (Karin Oellers-Frahm & Andreas
Zimmerman eds., Springer 2d ed. 2001).
17.
Project on International Courts and Tribunals, New York University, at http://www.pict-pcti.org
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
18.
See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and InternationalRelations
Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L 205 (1993).
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The legal scholarship tends to be either descriptive, that is, it details,
sometimes ad nauseam, how the particular institution was created, the scope of
its remit, and the problems that may be anticipated in its operations.' 9
Sometimes the legal scholarship is anxious about the complications of too many
fora.2" Where these two lines of scholarship, international relations and
international law come together is where they ask what effect the proliferation
phenomenon will have on the theoretical framework of their particular
discipline. Here the general and common theme has been the demise of the
state-centered sovereignty system.2 The frequently observed exponential rise
in transnational movement of peoples, goods, and services has resulted in both
the inability of purely national institutions to accommodate such transnational
activity and has exposed the limits of a separate sovereignty system. The
creation of institutions to deal with transnational activity is seen as a direct
functional outgrowth of the movement and communications revolution.2 2
At this point, the scholarship settles down into three main categories. First,
there are the zealous internationalists who welcome the creation of virtually any
new international institution with joy, see it as one more step on the road to
global governance and are entirely happy with the nails being driven into the
coffin of sovereignty.23 At the other end of the spectrum are the die-hard
nationalists, who resist all new international regimes, whether in the form of
multi-lateral treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol,24 or the establishment of new
institutions, such as the International Criminal Court.25 This group tends to
come from those who live in economically and militarily powerful states and for
whom the old state sovereignty system meant "winning." This group rightly
understands that the creation of international mechanisms that its country does
not (either entirely or perhaps even partially) control means the end of its

19.
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (two volumes) (Transnational

Publishers Inc. 1995).
20.
See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Institutionsof InternationalJustice, 52 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 473
(1999).
21.
Id.
22.
J.M. CHAPMAN & PAUL REUTER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 53 (Praeger 1961); see
generally Robert 0. Keohane, InternationalInstitutions: Can Interdependence Work?, 110 FOREIGN POL. 82
(1998).
23.
Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ,ECJ and the Integrity ofInternationalLaw, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
1, 12 (2003); Ian Ward, The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2091 (2003).
24.
Kyoto Protocolto the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, UNFCC. See full text of protocol, at http://unfccc.intresource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (last visited
Mar. 16, 2004).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), at http://www.un.orglaw/icc/index
25.
.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). See also DISPUTE SETTLEMENT INPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote
16, at 2069.
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dominance over preferred outcomes to any dispute that may arise." They write
vehemently about the illegitimacy of such institutions and resist participation
in such international regimes.27 In the middle of these two groups, the
internationalists and the nationalists, with their very different approaches
towards the appropriate basis and scope of international law, are the groups I
will call the "cautionaries." They observe the phenomenon of proliferation of
international settlement mechanisms but tend to concentrate on recounting the
flaws of such mechanism and pointing out what these mechanisms cannot be
expected to do.28 On the whole, I think they represent the group that suspects
they have seen the future in such institutions, but are not sure they like the
future because they recognize that the old mold-the state centered system-is
waning. The uncertainty of what will rise in its place troubles them.
Some areas of international law now have a choice of dispute settlement
mechanisms and those mechanisms are already working well. For example, if
we take continental shelf disputes: such disputes can be settled between states
diplomatically, via arbitration, at the ICJ or at the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. In the area of international commercial dispute resolution there
are a plethora of venues available. 29 The scholarship in this area is already well
into methods for assessing preferences in terms of procedural rules, substantive
rules and enforceability.3"
Just as I believe that law and settlement systems within a state reduce the
likelihood of civil disturbances within the state, so I believe that the availability
of well established and respected institutions for the settlement of international
disputes, including claims to self-determination, makes it a lot less likely that
we shall see wars breaking out. The issues that have settlement mechanisms in
place seldom give rise to armed conflict. Because of the variety of available

Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders,27 WILSON Q. 22, 25 (2003):
Our willingness to promote and sign on to international law would be second to
none-except when it came to any conventions that might require a change in U.S
domestic law or policy. The principal organs of U.S foreign policy... emphatically
resisted the idea that international law could be a means of changing internal U.S law.
Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary InternationalLaw and InternationalHuman Rights Litigation
27.
26.

in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395

(1999) (quoting from Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517, 575 (1966) and Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw,
33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 665, 708-09 (1986)).
28.
Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truth and Consequences, 38 TEXAS INT'L
LJ. 405 (2003).
For more detail of international commercial law and tribunals, see Sunil R. Haijani, The
29.
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods in United States Courts, 23 HoUS. J. INT'L L.
49 (2000).
Id. (quoting United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
30.
art. 7, 19 I.L.M. 671, 672 (opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980)).
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settlement mechanisms for continental self delimitation disputes, it is now much
less likely that there will be wars over such disputes.
IV. CAUSES OF ARMED CONFLICT

Another favorite topic of both international relations, and lately international law, is examining the causes of war and asking whether anything reduces
the likelihood of conflict. This is, of course, of crucial importance to selfdetermination claims because they so often result in bloodshed. The muchtouted "findings" of some scholars is the observation that democracies never
fight each other.31 These scholars have elaborate definitions of conflict and
what counts as a democracy.32 Having observed this "fact," they then set about
proselytizing for democracy.
Now, democratic governance usually implies a whole series of beliefs in
the worth of the individual, transparency of governmental structures, various
individual freedoms, and restrictions on governmental excesses all of which
certainly have value in themselves, although some of the newer democracies
challenge these linkages. The jury is still out on whether democracy, as such,
will ultimately reduce interstate conflict particularly where some democracies
seem trigger-happy in starting wars with non-democracies whenever they like.
A much more convincing argument about reducing conflict is that international
dispute settlement mechanisms reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict. As
the availability of dispute settlement mechanisms grow, so the likelihood of
conflict shrinks. Now, it may well be that such institutions are more likely to
be established if the basic governmental structure of states is democratic and,
if that is so, we should encourage democracy for that reason, as well as all the
other reasons, but I think it takes more than mere democracy to create
international settlement mechanisms.
What it takes, fundamentally, is a belief in international settlement with
international rules. This means a fundamental belief that nationally cabined
rules will not work. The question then arises as to why claims in certain well
established areas of international law, such as self-determination, have virtually
no place to be resolved in (other than inhospitable national courts) and what
would be the outcome if there were some place to take such claims.

31.

R.J. Rummel, Eliminating Democide and War through an Alliance of Democracies, 18 INT'L
56-57 (2001).
See generally WHAT Is DEMOCRACY? (Alain Touraine & David Macey trans., Westview Press

J. ON WORLD PEACE 55,

32.
1997); EDWARD

MCWHINNEY, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER IN

A REVOLUTIONARY AGE (Holmes & Meier 1981).
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V. THE LACK OF SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS

First, why is there such a dearth of settlement fora for claims to selfdetermination? My guess is that because claims to self-determination strike
directly at the heart of the state sovereignty system, they will be among the last
to find a hospitable forum for settlement. Many international issues are
necessarily transnational and thus create pressure for international settlement
mechanisms. Environmental concerns need to be settled internationally because
environmental problems are no respecters of national borders.
One of the difficulties for peoples' claims to self-determination is that
"peoples" always live within a state. Even if a people live in several states, such
as the Kurds, each one of them lives within a state. Each state can then see the
"problem" of self-determination as an intra-state problem, entirely within the
state's domestic jurisdiction. The state exists to control and regulate the life of
the people and resources within its jurisdictions. The prospect of relinquishing
control over peoples and resources is the prospect of dismembering the existing
state. This prospect is unwelcome to all states and their resistance to agreeing
to participate in fora that may result in the loss of their very limbs is not
surprising. The ultimate question here is whether territorial integrity/sovereignty trumps self-determination of peoples or vice-versa: whether we are
willing to adapt our legal rules to restrain the tyranny of the majority within the
state, as we do in our national system for certain subjects, or whether we will
reduce claims of self-determination to the age-old law of the jungle: might is
right. To ask the question should be to answer it. Will nation states allow a
question they perceive as intra-national to be resolved by international standards
and international institutions?
VI. CHALLENGING PROPOSAL

I want to propose what I see as the mechanism that holds out the best hope
of success for providing a peaceful resolution to claims for self-determination,
though I confess it is a distant dream. I refer to the drafting of a treaty defining
the right of self-determination, defining to whom the right applies, and creating,
within the four comers of the proposed treaty, a mandatory dispute settlement
mechanism. Clearly, states would have to agree to such a treaty. That may
seem unlikely at the moment. It took at least 50 years to establish the
International Criminal Court. Criminal trials were seen as the prerogative of
states and the whole notion of the existence of international crimes was hotly
disputed. But we have to start somewhere and the treaty route may hold the
most promise.

